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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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The last several years before the global downturn of 
2008–2009 saw rapid credit growth in Poland. The 
credit-to-gross domestic product ratio rose from about 
25 percent in 2004 to close to 50 percent in 2009. 
Such an expansion itself might potentially be a source 
of risks to financial stability, but it was also coupled 
with relatively new phenomena, such as massive foreign 
currency lending. Thanks to the pro-active attitude of the 
Polish authorities and sound economic fundamentals, 
the risks largely have not materialized. Since 2006 the 
financial supervisor has addressed in its recommendations 
for banks the problem of foreign exchange lending, 
which contributed to the high quality of the portfolio. 
Before the economy slowed down, the Polish Financial 
Supervisory Authority persuaded banks to accumulate 
This paper is a product of the  Office of the Chief Economist, Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort 
by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors 
may be contacted at michal.kruszka@knf.gov.pl and michal.kowalczyk@knf.gov.pl.  
an additional capital buffer that helped protect them 
from the negative consequences of the downturn. Some 
regulatory concepts that had been put into place in 
Poland in the previous years, including quantitative 
liquidity requirements, are now being implemented 
globally. The Polish Financial Supervisory Authority 
participates in international debates on a new regulatory 
regime for the financial system. The major message the 
authority intends to convey is that all new regulations 
must be tailored carefully. Regulators should make an 
effort to ensure that the benefits of enhanced quality 
of the capital base or the countercyclical buffer are not 
compromised by international overregulation that could 






MACRO-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF CREDIT 

























JEL: G28, E32, E51, E58, E61 
Key words: financial regulation, macro-prudential policies 
     2 
MACRO-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF CREDIT BOOMS 
AND BUSTS—THE CASE OF POLAND
1  
 
I. MANAGEMENT OF CREDIT BOOMS AND BUSTS 
1. Background 
The  macroeconomic  situation  in  Poland  during  the  period  2004  to  2008  created  favorable 
conditions for the development of the financial system. The average annual rate of gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth in that period amounted to 4.3 percent. An increase in employment and 
wages had an impact on the improvement of the financial standing of households. This contributed 
to  a  high  growth  rate  of  mortgage  loans  and  a  growing  demand  of  households  for  services 
provided by financial institutions. An improvement in the financial standing of enterprises and a 
larger absorption of European Union funds were also recorded from 2004 to 2008. This, together 
with  significant  capacity  utilization  and  a  prospect  for  maintaining  high  economic  growth, 
contributed to the rise in investment, another determinant of higher credit demand.  
However, the last  year  of the analyzed period,  2008, must be divided in  two parts. The first 
(approximately  the  first  three  quarters)  was  characterized  by  a  fast  rate  of  economic  growth, 
despite the symptoms of the global economic downturn. In mid-September 2008, however, the 
second wave of the world financial crisis passed through Polish financial markets. It led to serious 
disturbances in the functioning of markets; a sharp increase of aversion to risk and a tightening of 
banks’ lending policy resulted in an increase in financing costs. As a result of the escalation of the 
crisis, emerging countries experienced sales of assets (including currencies) along with a strong 
decrease in prices of commodities and a slowdown in investment processes. These resulted in a 
worsening of the economic situation and declining prospects for a world economic upturn. A 
strong slowdown in the Polish GDP growth rate (see figure 1) and deteriorating hopes for its 
rebound  occurred  as  a  consequence  of  decreasing  external  demand  for  Polish  exports  and 
subsequent adjustments by enterprises and households. 
Despite the slowdown, the condition of the Polish economy was better than the economies of other 
EU countries. Poland turned out to be the only EU country that managed to maintain a positive 
growth rate in 2009. Subsequent economic growth in Poland reached 3.8 percent in 2010 and 4.1 
percent in 2011 Q1 (at constant 2000 prices) on the back of public and private consumption and a 
turnaround in stockbuilding, even though private consumption decelerated somewhat late in 2010. 
Industrial  production  has  accelerated,  and  business  confidence  indicators  suggest  continued 
expansion. At the beginning of 2011, Poland had forecast its public finance sector debt at 6.5 
percent of annual GDP (according to ESA 95 methodology).  Due to an increase in economic 
growth,  the  Polish  government  announced  in  June  2011  that  the  deficit  would  be  25  percent 
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smaller than had been anticipated. Poland is on track to slash its public finance deficit to 5.6 
percent of 2011 GDP. 
Monetary policy of the National Bank of Poland 
The basic objective of monetary policy of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) is to maintain price 
stability.  Since  1999  the  central  bank  has  operated  a  direct  inflation-targeting  policy  regime. 
Within the framework of this strategy, the Monetary Policy Council (one of the main bodies of the 
NBP) sets the inflation target and then adjusts the NBP basic interest rates in order to maximize 
the probability of achieving the target. Since the beginning of 2004, the NBP has pursued an 
inflation target of 2.5 percent with a permissible fluctuation band of +/- 1 percentage point (see 
figure 2). The NBP does not define any countercyclical objective as such, but the MPC can change 
the required-reserve rate.  
The  required  reserve  imposed  by  the  NBP  constitutes  a  portion,  expressed  in  zloty,  of  funds 
accumulated on bank accounts and obtained from the sale of securities and other repayable funds 
accepted  by  the  banks,  except  for  funds  taken  from  another  domestic  bank  or  obtained  from 
abroad (with a maturity of at least two years). The required reserve is held on accounts with the 
NBP. Reserve requirements are set by the Monetary Policy Council. From October 2003 until May 
2009 the required-reserve rate  was  3.5 percent  for all the types  of deposits,  except  for funds 
obtained from repurchase agreements, whose required-reserve rate is 0 percent. From June, 2009 
until December 2010 the required-reserve rate was lowered to 3 percent. In the opinion of the 
council,  the  reduction  of  the  rate  should  be  conducive  to  increasing  banks'  lending.  Since 
December  2010,  the  required-reserve  rate  is  again  3.5  percent.  The  MPC  set  the  same 
requirements for domestic and foreign currency deposits. 
Financial system developments 
In 2008 the value of assets of all financial institution reached PLN 1,403.5 billion, the equivalent 
of 110 percent of the annual Polish GDP (table 1 and table 2). During 2004–2007, the most rapidly 
developing institutions were related to the capital market. Investment funds and brokerage entities 
were able to increase assets by around 60 percent in 2006 (see table 3). The global financial crisis 
and rapid decrease of stock market indices (see figure 3) stopped this process. Investment funds 
lost almost 50 percent of assets in 2008. At the same time, the banking sector performed quite well 
and increased assets by 31 percent. The next two years showed that the Polish financial market is 
very bullish—all participants increased assets, and their value reached 118 percent of GDP in 
2010. Despite the growing importance on nonbanking financial institutions during 2004–2007, the 
banking sector still plays a dominant role in the Polish financial system. The last years did not 
change this situation.  
The capitalization of the stock market in Poland significantly increased during the 2004–2007 
period (from PLN 214 billion to PLN 510 billion). This indicator drastically decreased to PLN 267 
billion in 2008, two years later reached PLN 542 billion, i.e., the capitalization in 2010 was higher 
than  in  2007.  The  Polish  stock  market  remained  the  biggest  stock  market  in  the  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe  (CEE)  region,  but  its  capitalization  is  much  lower  than  the  capitalization  of 
developed  markets  of  the  euro  area.  Despite  a  significant  increase,  the  Polish  stock  market   4 
capitalization-to-GDP ratio is around 40 percent (see figure 4), while assets of the banking sector 
reached 81 percent of GDP in 2008, and 82 percent in 2010. 
There is no universally accepted definition of credit boom or excessive credit growth in Poland. 
The stock of loans is still relatively low, especially in comparison with other EU countries. The 
ratio of credit of the nonfinancial sector to GDP is below 50 percent (see figure 6). Nevertheless 
the  NBP  and  the  Polish  Financial  Supervision  Authority  (KNF)  prepared  some  estimates 
concerning this subject. The first one is based on prices of the residential properties.  
An increase in prices of residential property has been observed in Poland since 2003 but so far has 
not exceeded 10–20 percent annually. In 2006, the growth rate of prices for flats significantly 
accelerated (see figure 5). The increases were recorded in both the primary and secondary market. 
The main reason for the acceleration of prices for residential property in 2006 was the growing 
imbalance between demand and supply on the housing market coupled with strongly increasing 
price expectations. 
Apart from the structural factors, the demand increase resulted from the impact of factors related 
to the phase of the business cycle and short-term factors. The major reasons for the increased 
demand for flats include (i) the improvement in the financial situation of many households, (ii) 
better  availability  of  financing  for  housing  investments  with  bank  loans,  and  (iii)  increased 
investment and speculative demand. Since the beginning of 2008, prices of residential property 
have been stabilizing or decreasing. The slowdown of the growth rate of prices in the primary 
market may have been influenced by a further increase in supply in the main urban areas. The 
decline in prices of flats in 2009–2010 was mainly caused by a decrease in households' effective 
demand. The following  factors  contributed to the decline in  demand: (i) tightening of banks’ 
lending  policy,  (ii)  a  slower  growth  rate  of  households'  disposable  income  and  (iii)  a  rise  of 
unemployment. On the other hand, the activity rate also increased, which means that previously 
economically inactive persons became active job seekers (see figure 25). According to information 
on residential prices, the period 2006–2007 can be considered a housing credit boom.  
An alternative estimation of the credit boom period could be based on the Basel Committee’s 2010 
proposal. The committee proposed using the difference between the current private credit ratio as a 
percentage of GDP and its trend value estimated by means of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (the 
―credit-to-GDP gap‖). When gaps rise above 2 percentage points, creation of the capital buffer 
should  start.  The  historical  data  of  the  credit-to-GDP  ratio  and  Hodrick-Prescott  trends  are 
presented on figure 7. The housing-loan-to-GDP ratio was also analyzed (see figure 8). The gaps 
are presented in figure 9 and figure 10. The results suggest that the credit boom in Poland started 
in 2008 Q3 and probably ended at the beginning of 2010.  
We must remember that the HP filter generates a highly unreliable estimate of the trend at the end 
of the data period. For this reason alternative methods could be used. Reports of the NBP (2011) 
and  Czech  National  Bank  (CNB  2011)  presented  results  of  other  estimations.  The  final 
conclusions  suggested  that  the  HP  filter-based  calculation  of  credit  booms  is  not  necessarily 
appropriate in the case of Poland. For the CEE countries in particular, rapid credit growth may 
simply mean convergence with values typical of the advanced economies, and not necessarily 
excessive  borrowing.  However,  the  dynamics  of  housing  loans  during  2006–2008  can  be 
considered an indicator of an early phase of the credit boom.    5 
During 2004–2008, the average annual growth rate of the nominal value of loans for households 
reached 21 percent, while corporate loans increased by 13 percent. Consequently, the share of 
loans for households in credit portfolios  increased from  40 percent  to 60 percent.  During the 
following two years the annual growth rate of loans for households remained positive (7 percent), 
and corporate loans fell by 3 percent. The decline of corporate loans can be explained by banks’ 
increasing aversion to risk (even though the companies are often using the capital market to raise 
external  funding).  As  a  result,  loans  to  households  are  the  most  important  part  of  the  Polish 
banking sector’s credit portfolio (see figure 11). 
Foreign currency loans accounted for about 27 percent of banks’ credit portfolio during 2004–
2008. This share increased to 36 percent in 2009 Q1 and fell to 33 percent in 2011 Q1 (figure 12). 
The share of foreign currency loans in loans for households is higher than for corporate loans (see 
figure 13 and figure 14). The main determinants of such currency structures are high interest rate 
disparities in Poland and abroad (figure 15) and stable appreciation of the zloty during 2004–2008 
(figure 16), leading to customers’ adaptive expectations. It should be stressed that most housing 
loans  granted  during  2004–2008  have  a  variable  interest  rate.  The  banks  are  using  interbank 
interest rates as reference rates. In Poland, the cost of credit, also denominated in foreign currency, 
is closely correlated with the interest rate. This does not quite apply to all Central and Eastern 
European countries. In Hungary, for instance, a large portion of real estate loans, especially those 
denominated in local currency, were state subsidized, and their interest rates have not changed 
notably since the beginning of the crisis.   
The amounts of outstanding real estate loans for households increased significantly in the years 
2004–2008. The share of this kind of loans in banks’ credit portfolio was 53 percent at the end of 
2008 (34 percent at the end of 2004). Despite a sharp decline in the annual growth rate of nominal 
value, housing loans are still the most important part of households’ credit portfolio (see figure 
17). 
The allocation of corporate credit across sectors was very stable during 2004–2008. The majority 
(about 53 percent) of large credit exposures was dedicated to the service sector, for example, retail 
trade  and  repairs  (see  table  8).  Approximately  35  percent  of  large  credits  were  granted  to 
manufacturing. The share of construction increased from 7 percent (2004) to almost 11 percent 
(2008). This structure changed in 2010. The most important difference was the lower share of 
services  (49  percent  in  September  2010)  and  the  sharp  increase  of  loans  to  construction 
companies. 
The structure of the banking sector in  Poland  did  not  change significantly during 2004–2008 
Commercial entities made up about 50 of the sector’s banks. There were almost 600 cooperative 
banks, but their share in total banking assets was small, around 6 percent. The most important 
structural change was a dynamic increase in the number of branches of credit institutions (see table 
4). This was a consequence of Poland’s EU accession and adoption of ―single banking passport‖ 
regime.  
Some of the branches of credit institutions introduced very aggressive development strategies. As 
a result, the share of branches in total banking assets increased to 5.4 percent at the end of 2008. 
Branches and cooperative banks were able to collect the same value of assets.    6 
The biggest branch in the Polish banking sector is a branch of Greek EFG Eurobank Ergasis. The 
branch operates in Poland under the brand Polbank EFG, and its share in total banking assets is 
about 2 percent. Since July 2011 the amended banking law has been in place to facilitate the 
transformation of a branch into a subsidiary. EFG Eurobank has agreed to sell the branch, once it 
transforms, to Raiffeisen International and has already booked a profit from this transaction. 
Since the mid-1990s the majority of commercial banks in Poland have been controlled by foreign 
investors. The average share of foreign subsidiaries in total banking assets is around 65 percent 
(see table 5). There were investors from 17 countries in the banking sector in Poland in 2008. The 
dominant role is played by five countries: Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and 
Belgium  (see  table  6).  However,  the  important  and  positive  feature  of  ownership  structure  is 
diversification according to the strategic investor’s country of origin, which makes the banking 
sector relatively resistant to negative economic events that may occur in particular countries.  
Financial market  liberalization and the rising  share of foreign investors in  the banking sector 
should be considered an important factor explaining a considerable share of foreign-currency-
denominated loans in Poland. With the freedom to operate in international markets, banks have 
gained easier access to foreign funding, including via their parent banks. This has paved the way 
for the development of their lending offers. It should be underlined that during 2008–2010 there 
were several bank mergers and changes of strategic investors. For example, GE Money merged 
with Bank BPH in 2008, BNP Paribas acquired Fortis Bank in 2009, and AIB sold its Polish 
subsidiary (BZ WBK) to Banco Santander in 2010. 
During 2004–2008 bank profitability measured by return of equity (ROE) and return of assets 
(ROA) did not change significantly (table 7). However, banks noted a decline in gross profitability 
indices in 2009. The performance of the banking sector improved in 2010, but indices were lower 
than during the 2004–2008 period. The main source of net profit of the banking sector is interest 
income.  However,  growing  competition  and  a  lack  of  possibilities  for  a  further  decrease  in 
margins  resulted in  banks  more often searching for non-interest-related sources  of income.  In 
Poland,  the  most  important  source  of  non-interest-related  income  in  the  banking  sector  is 
commission and fee income.  
During 2004–2008, the quality of banks’ credit portfolio significantly improved. Nonperforming 
loans ratio declined from 15 percent in 2004 to 3.5 percent in 2008. The value of impaired loans 
increased in 2009 and 2010, both in corporate and household loans. However, the rise of impaired 
loans ratio in 2010 was slower than in 2009. 
The most important nonbanking financial institutions involved in credit supply in Poland are credit 
unions. They are classified as monetary financial institution. However, activities of credit unions 
are not regulated by the KNF. The National Association of Credit Unions (KSKOK) supervises 
them. The credit unions are not participants in the deposit guarantee scheme managed by the Bank 
Guarantee Fund. 
Since 2006 Q4, due to legislative changes, the scope of financial services offered by credit unions 
has expanded to include loans and other financing transactions granted for periods exceeding five 
years.  The  sale  of  these  financial  products  had  a  significant  impact  on  accredit  unions’  high   7 
growth rate of assets in 2007. The regulations limiting the maximum repayment period of real 
estate loans granted by credit unions to five years were reintroduced in 2009. 
Despite a dynamic growth of the credit union sector, assets remained below 1 percent of the 
balance sheet total of the financial system in Poland. During 2004–2008 the value of loans granted 
by credit unions amounted to approximately 1 percent of the value of loans granted by the banking 
sector. 
Cross-border flows 
During 2004–2008 capital flows to Poland were smaller in size and less volatile than in other 
emerging European countries (see figure 18 and figure 19) (IMF 2010). On the whole, capital 
inflows to emerging Europe were justified by a real convergence process and financial markets 
liberalization. While Poland experienced a decline in flows in 2009, the magnitude was relatively 
small. In 2009 Poland outpaced the CEE region in both gross and net capital inflows, due to a 
renewed risk appetite for strong emerging markets. 
Foreign direct investments (FDI) were the most stable part of gross capital inflows to Poland 
during 2004–2008 (see figure 21). The share of manufacturing FDI reached 37 percent in 2004, 
while the share of services  FDI reached 60 percent.  In 2008 the share of manufacturing FDI 
declined to 16 percent and the services share increased to 66 percent.   
Liabilities  from  portfolio  investment  played  a  significant  role  in  Poland,  likely  due  to  more 
developed and liquid equity and bond markets. The outflow of portfolio investment in 2007 and 
2008 was generated by means of the global financial crises and growing aversion to risk. 
The banking flows are a component of other investment liabilities. It should be underlined that 
foreign parent banks did not transfer liquid assets from Polish subsidiaries during 2007–2008. 
Moreover, they increased the value of investment liabilities for 2009–2010 (see figure 20). The 
practice of foreign investors can be explained by the good condition of Polish economy and the 
Polish  banking  sector.  The  regulations  adopted  by  financial  supervision  were  certainly  not 
negligible—see the next parts of this report.   
Poland has been a member of the EU since 2004. Article 63(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the  European  Union  (TFEU)  prohibits  capital  controls,  stating  that  ―all  restrictions  on  the 
movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall 
be prohibited.‖ Nevertheless, the prohibition needs to remain consistent with the member’s right 
―to  take  all  requisite  measures  to  prevent  infringements  of  national  laws  and  regulations,  in 
particular in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay 
down  procedures  for  the  declaration  of  capital  movements  for  purposes  of  administrative  or 
statistical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or 
public security‖ (Article 65(1)). Although this leaves a certain margin of discretion, the treaty 
clarifies  that  the  above  measures  and  procedures  cannot  constitute  ―a  means  of  arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments‖ (Article 
65(3)). Ultimately, the Court of Justice of the European Union is responsible for judging which 
measures are compatible with the rules of the treaty. Polish law follows the TFEU rules.    8 
There  are  no  plans  to  change  Polish  regulations  concerning  freedom  of  capital  movement.  It 
should be noted, however, in this context that the provisions of TFUE give the member states the 
right to adopt measures necessary to preserve financial stability. The case of Icelandic Landsbanki 
illustrated the weaknesses of the current European deposit guarantee system. The Polish—and 
European—authorities should think of ways to limit the risk that branches pose to the financial 
system. Without prejudice to the TFEU, one of the options to consider would be an extension of 
the local deposit guarantee scheme to cover also deposits held at significant branches of foreign 
banks, if their home scheme is deemed inadequate. That mechanism would also serve to mitigate 
the risk of banks in the same market exploiting—for marketing purposes—the fact of belonging to 
guarantee  schemes  with  different  levels  of  reliability  as  a  means  of  competition  for  clients’ 
deposits. 
In accordance with the EU law, Poland amended the Banking Act in 2004. The new regulations 
introduced the freedom to provide cross-border banking services, i.e., customers are able to obtain 
credit directly from foreign European banks without the intermediation of a local subsidiary. Data 
presented in figure 22 show that this mode of supply is not a very important channel of credit 
inflow. The share of cross-border loans did not exceed 15 percent of all loans granted to the 
nonfinancial sector. 
2. Macro-prudential regulation 
Capital requirements: These were adopted in Poland in 1997 together with the introduction of 
new  Banking  Act.  According  to  Article  128(3),  each  bank  is  obliged  to  maintain  its  capital 
adequacy ratio at a level of at least 8 percent, with a bank commencing operations required to 
maintain this ratio at no less than 15 percent for the first 12 months of operations, and at no less 
than 12 percent for the following 12 months.  
The  European  Union  by  adoption  of  Directive  2006/48/EC  and  2006/49/EC  implemented  the 
Basel II provision. Poland also adopted amendments of legal measures, but the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio is still 8 percent. The capital adequacy ratio of the bank is calculated as a quotient 
multiplied by 100, where the numerator is the value of the bank’s own funds (regulatory capital 
increased by short-term capital) and the denominator is the overall capital requirement multiplied 
by 12.5. The principles of overall capital requirement estimation (especially the risk weights) are 
determined by the Resolutions of the KNF. The binding act is the Resolution No. 76/2010 of 10
th 
March 2010. 
The actual capital adequacy ratio in the Polish banking system is significantly higher than the 
minimum binding level (see table 7). However, the financial crisis created a very unfavorable 
environment for the development of banks in 2008–2009. Against this backdrop the KNF made 
sure that the majority of accrued profit from previous year went to strengthen the banking sector 
capital base. In January 2009, it was recommended that banks set up an additional capital buffer—
a 2 percent surplus above the required 8 percent minimum ratio. It was not a rules-based action, 
but a discretionary and nonbiding suggestion. 
In 2009, the vast majority of banks followed the recommendations of the supervisory authority and 
decided to retain profits for 2008. Some of the banks operating in Poland received support from 
their foreign owners, in the form of participation in share capital increases and credit facilities.   9 
Higher equity (currently in excess of PLN 100 billion) helped to maintain the lending activity and 
offset the higher capital requirements. As a result, the average capital adequacy ratio of the Polish 
banking sector increased from 11.2 percent at the end of 2008 to 13.8 percent at the end of 2010.  
In June 2011 the KNF amended Resolution No. 76/2010 of March 10, 2010, and raised risk weight 
of  foreign  currency-denominated  retail  credit  exposures  from  75  percent  to  100  percent.  The 
change will be effective as of June 30, 2012. 
Liquidity  rules:  The  liquidity  position  of  Polish  banks  and  the  risk  related  to  liquidity 
management,  both  short  and  long  term,  is  subject  to  supervisory  regulation.  It  should  be 
emphasized  that  the  regulations  in  this  respect  implemented  by  the  Commission  for  Banking 
Supervision and later confirmed by the KNF had been developed before the onset of turbulences 
on the financial markets. Recommendation P on liquidity-monitoring principles (adopted in 2002) 
and  Resolution  No.  9/2007  of  the  Commission  for  Banking  Supervision  (defining  liquidity 
standards binding for banks) are the key elements of these regulations. Resolution No. 9/2007 
came into force in January 2008. However, until June 29, 2008, banks and branches of credit 
institutions were not obliged to meet the regulatory limits. KNF took over the function of banking 
supervision on January 1, 2008 and KNF adopted Resolution No. 386/2008 of December 17, 2008, 
defining  liquidity  standards  binding  for  banks  (superseding  Resolution  No.  9/2007  KNB). 
Resolution No. 386/2008 came into force in January 2009. 
Resolutions  of  the  Commission  on  Banking  Supervision  (KNB)  and  KNF  on  bank  liquidity 
standards were aimed at  implementing minimum  quantitative and qualitative requirements  for 
managing liquidity risk, which should increase the security of bank operations. The resolutions on 
liquidity  standards  introduced  a  breakdown  of  banks'  asset  and  liability  categories  by  their 
liquidity or stability. Assets have been broken down into the following four main categories: 
1.  core  liquidity  reserve—cash  and  receivables  as  well  as  other  assets  in  the  amount 
obtainable within 7 days 
2.  supplementary  liquidity  reserve—receivables  as  well  as  other  assets  in  the  amount 
obtainable within 7 to 30 days 
3.  assets of limited liquidity—assets resulting from banking activities outside the wholesale 
financial market 
4.  illiquid assets—assets not resulting from banking activities 
The resolutions of KNB and KNF define the following main liability categories: 
  regulatory capital—own funds less the sum of the value of capital requirements for market 
risk, settlement/delivery risk, and counterparty risk 
  stable external funds—funds that the bank includes in stable funding sources, in particular 
core  deposits;  own  securities  issued  that  are  not  included  in  regulatory  capital;  other 
liabilities with the original maturity over one year, which the bank intends to renew; and 
other liabilities resulting from banking activities whose plan of obtaining and renewing has 
been approved by the supervisory board   10 
  unstable external funds 
These categories of assets and liabilities are then used to define the liquidity standards. Banks and 
branches of credit institutions are obliged to meet liquidity standards above the minimum level set 
by the Resolution No. 386/2008.  
Liquidity standards of monetary institution depend on the size and legal form of the institution. 
Banks with total assets above PLN 200 million are required to meet the following standards: 
  short-term liquidity gap—the sum of core and supplementary liquidity reserve less unstable 
external funds; minimum value = 0.00 
  short-term liquidity ratio—the ratio of the sum of core and supplementary liquidity reserve 
to unstable external funds; minimum value = 1.00  
  ratio of coverage of illiquid assets with regulatory capital—minimum value = 1.00  
  ratio of coverage of illiquid assets and assets of limited liquidity with regulatory capital 
and stable external funds—minimum value = 1.00 
Branches of credit institutions with total assets above PLN 200 million are required to meet only 
short-term liquidity standards. Banks with total assets below PLN 200 million are required to meet 
the following standards: 
  share of core and supplementary liquidity reserve in total assets—minimum value =  0.20 
  ratio of coverage of illiquid assets with regulatory capital—minimum value = 1.00. 
Branches  of  credit  institutions  with  total  assets  below  PLN  200  million  must  meet  only  the 
minimum share of core and supplementary liquidity reserve in total assets.  
According to the binding principles, banks and branches of credit institutions are obliged to notify 
the  KNF  of  any  reduction  in  liquidity  measures  below  the  supervisory  standards  and  to  take 
immediate actions to return to adequate level of funds securing liquidity. A vast majority of banks 
meet liquidity standards (see table 9). A few banks have difficulties in meeting long-term liquidity 
standards. However, the share of these banks in the assets of the sector is insignificant. 
The largest rise has been recorded for the ratio of coverage of illiquid assets with  regulatory 
capital, which should be attributed to the increase in regulatory capital as most banks have retained 
profits generated in 2008. The situation of commercial banks is relatively better in terms of short-
term liquidity. Since the entry into force of Resolution No. 386/2008, the average value of the 
short-term liquidity ratio has been markedly higher than that of the ratio of coverage of illiquid 
assets and assets of limited liquidity with regulatory capital and stable external funds (given the 
same minimum required value—see figure 23). 
In connection with the difficult situation of the financial markets and the deepening problems of 
financial institutions in global markets, caused by the crisis in the US real estate market, the KNF 
has  taken  a  number  of  measures  with  respect  to  the  supervised  entities.  These  will  enable   11 
continuous monitoring of their operations and, in particular, their liquidity positions. The KNF 
immediately reacted to any signs of financial groups’ problems that could affect the situation of 
their subsidiaries operating in Poland by focusing on meetings with banks’ management boards, 
communicating with their home supervision authorities, and conducting regulatory activities. 
Besides devising rule-based liquidity standards in 2009, the KNF undertook discretionary actions 
aimed at maintaining the liquidity positions of Polish banks. The KNF imposed an obligation on 
banks to provide, on a daily basis, information on their short-term liquidity and transactions with 
foreign entities, including daily reports on the banks’ new exposures to foreign entities. Some 
individual steps were taken with respect to selected banks, which included specific monitoring of 
the  bank’s  exposure  to  a  strategic  investor,  capital  group,  or  group  members.  The  KNF  paid 
particular attention to transactions with possible unjustified transfers to parent institutions. In its 
daily  monitoring  activities  no  such  transactions  were  observed.  Transactions  with  related  and 
nonrelated institutions remained at a normal level.  
Asset  valuation  rules:  According  to  Article  55(5)  of  the  Accounting  Act,  commercial  banks 
operating in Poland are obliged to prepare consolidated financial statements in accordance with 
International Accounting Standards/International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS). This 
regulation  was  adopted  in  2005.  Cooperative  banks  must  prepare  financial  statements  in 
accordance with the Polish Accounting Act. Provisions of accounting standards did not vary at 
peaks or troughs in the business or credit cycle in Poland, and asset valuation rules cannot be 
considered as a macro-prudential measures. 
Direct credit controls: In certain circumstances, the Monetary Policy Council may restrict the 
volume of funds granted to borrowers by banks, or may require the holding of non-interest-bearing 
deposits with the NBP against foreign funds used by banks and domestic entrepreneurs (Article 46 
of the Act on the National Bank of Poland). This rule was adopted in 1997 but has never been 
used. 
Provisioning rules: Current regulations on classifying loans according to their risk categories and 
on  procedures  for  specific  provisioning  were  stipulated  in  the  Regulation  of  the  Minister  of 
Finance of December 10, 2003. This regulation was superseded by the Regulation of the Ministry 
of  Finance  of  December  16,  2008,  (henceforth  the  Regulation),  but  basic  principles  did  not 
change, so it is fair to say that regulations concerning provisioning have been largely unchanged 
since January 2004. 
The Regulation introduced classification of loans according to repayment performance. A bank is 
obliged to classify loans with regard to the delay in payments of principal or interest. If the delay 
in payments is between 3 and 6 months then a loan is classified as substandard. The delay between 
6 and 12 months means that a loan is classified as doubtful. A loan is classified as a loss if the 
delay in payment exceeds 12 months.  Loans  classified as substandard, doubtful, or losses are 
recognized  as  impaired  loans.  The  classification  of  consumer  loans  has  been  limited  to  two 
categories: satisfactory (the delay is payment is less than 6 months), or loss (the delay in payment 
is more than 6 months). The impaired loans are subject to specific provisioning requirements. 
These must constitute at  least  20 percent  of the provisioning base for substandard claims, 50 
percent for doubtful ones, and 100 percent for loans classified as losses.    12 
The Regulation also adopted an additional (economic) criterion of loans classification. The claim 
can be recognized as an impaired loan if the economic standing of the borrower suggests that it 
may experience difficulties with debt repayment. It means that loan classification can be adjusted 
to reflect business cycle conditions and can be considered to be of a macro-prudential nature. 
However, the economic criterion is not applicable to any kind of household loans.  
The regulation assigning loans to particular risk categories and specifying procedures for specific 
provisioning, which came into effect at the beginning of 2004, resulted in some irregular loans 
being reclassified as lower risk or indeed as satisfactory. Around a third of the decline in the 
irregular  loan  ratio  in  2004  can  be  attributed  to  regulatory  factors,  primarily  to  consumer 
exposures classified substandard and doubtful being upgraded to satisfactory, and to charge-offs of 
some loss exposures.  
The  rules  stipulated  in  the  Regulation  are  binding  for  banks  that  apply  Polish  accounting 
standards, i.e., currently, cooperative banks. The commercial banks adopted IAS/IFRS, and they 
are allowed to omit the classification approach adopted by the Ministry of Finance. These banks 
are calculating the ―recoverable amount‖ of loans and then provision for a loss in value against the 
difference relative to the outstanding loan principal and interest. The principles for determining the 
recoverable amounts are set individually at particular banks (or banking groups). This means that, 
in the case of large corporate loans, the financial situation of the customer has a greater bearing 
than the current regulation of the Ministry of Finance. The recoverable amount of retail loans and 
smaller  business  loans  are  assessed  on  a  portfolio  basis,  i.e.,  using  statistical  methods  for 
exposures with similar characteristics.  
Since 2005, discrepancies have been expected between banks applying domestic and international 
accounting rules, in terms of both loan classification and provisioning coverage for irregular loans. 
However,  in  accordance  with  the  suggestions  made  by  banking  supervisors,  banks  applying 
IAS/IFRS  were  obliged  to  prepare  information  on  irregular  loans  for  the  NBP  in  the  form 
corresponding  to  Polish  accounting  standards.  In  other  words,  in  the  case  of  banks  applying 
IAS/IFRS the results of portfolio classification, obtained according to internal models of loan 
impairment, are ‖translated‖ into categories most similar to those defined in the Regulation of 
Ministry of Finance. 
Other  regulations:  Recommendations  for  banks:  The  recommendations  adopted  by  Polish 
banking supervision (previously by the Commission for Banking Supervision, KNB, and now by 
the  KNF)  are  not  binding  regulations  and  their  provisions  stipulate  only  soft-law  measure. 
However, banks adapt the standards prescribed for them 
In response to detected shortcomings in the management of credit risk at some credit institutions, 
in March 2006 the KNB issued Recommendation S concerning good practices with regard to 
mortgage-secured loan exposures. The recommendation in its original form covered, inter alia, the 
following  areas:  (i)  the  risk  of  the  mortgage-secured  credit  exposure  portfolio;  (ii)  the  risk 
assumed (appropriate tools for the proper measurement of risk associated with mortgage-secured 
credit exposures); (iii) the borrower's FX risk and interest rate risk (a systematic analysis of the FX 
risk and interest rate risk borne by the borrower); (iv) collateral (proper verification of its value); 
and (v) customer protection issues (type and quality of information presented to customers).   13 
Specifically, it was recommended that banks evaluate the creditworthiness of a borrower applying 
for an FX loan under the assumption that the interest rate of the zloty loan and FX loan are the 
same,  and  the  outstanding  FX  loan  principal  is  20  percent  higher  to  accommodate  for  the 
additional FX risk. It was also recommended that banks use stress-test analysis of the exchange-
rate effect on credit risk. The minimum level of zloty depreciation used in that test should be no 
lower than a 30 percent decline over a 12-month horizon. 
Recommendation S also introduced standards of information disclosed to customers about FX 
risks by presenting them with the results of simulations of loan installments: including, among 
others, the case of a 20 percent depreciation of the zloty, the increase of interest to the level in 
force for the analogical zloty loan, and the depreciation of the zloty amounting to the difference 
between the maximum and minimum zloty exchange rate in the past 12 months. It appears that 
these had contributed to a rise in the awareness of the risks underlying fluctuations of the zloty 
exchange rate and interest rates among prospective borrowers. The KNB believed that measures 
introduced would have a downward impact on the demand for foreign currency loans.  
Recommendation  S  as  adopted  at  that  time  did  not  provide  specific  rules  for  how  the 
creditworthiness of the borrower should be established, but instead postulated extra buffers for FX 
loans. It proved not to be as effective in limiting proliferation of FX loans as was intended. In fact, 
in  the  years  following  its  implementation,  the  value  of  foreign-currency-denominated  loans 
increased substantially. 
In February 2010, in response to shortcomings in managing credit risk and the exchange-rate risk, 
the KNF adopted Recommendation T on good practices with regard to risk management of retail 
credit  exposures.  The  regulation  is  applicable  to  all  types  of  retail  credit  transactions.  All 
provisions of the Recommendation T were implemented by banks by the end of 2010. The purpose 
was to improve the evaluation of retail customers’ creditworthiness by banks. In contrast to the 
original language of Recommendation S, provisions of Recommendation T introduced, for the first 
time, quantitative standards for creditworthiness evaluation. These applied to household debt as 
well as to others. The recommendation stipulated that loan repayment burden cannot exceed 50 
percent of the net income for borrowers with income below the national average salary. In the case 
of other borrowers, this threshold should not exceed 65 percent. Moreover, it is recommended that 
banks should use stress-test analysis for setting the maximum burden limit. The analyses should 
assume a depreciation of the zloty at the minimum level of 30 percent and an increase in interest 
rates by at least 400 basis points. 
The  provision  of  Recommendation  S  on  the  maximum  Loan-to-Value  (LTV)  levels  was 
supplemented by the requirement to justify why a bank uses a particular maximum LTV limit. 
When  the  currency  of  a  loan  is  different  than  the  currency  in  which  collateral  is  valued,  a 
requirement has been introduced for calculation of LTV to increase the amount of a loan by 10 
percent  for  loans  with  maturity  of  up  to  5  years  and  by  20  percent  for  other  loans. 
Recommendation T also introduced requirements pertaining to the cost to borrowers of loan and 
other liability servicing. Pursuant to its provisions, a bank should set the maximum limits of the 
ratio of expenditure related to servicing loan and financial liabilities to a customer’s income. 
In January 2011 the KNF amended Recommendation S. The amended regulation comes fully into 
force  in  December  2011.  The  new  version  of  Recommendation  S  introduces  quantitative   14 
requirements. First, banks are obliged to justify the adopted maximum level of LTV ratio. Second, 
they have the obligation to adopt the maximum credit exposure repayment period of 25 years in 
the process of creditworthiness assessment, even if an expected repayment period is longer. Third, 
the  maximum  monthly  ratio  of  loan  repayment  expenditures  to  borrower's  net  income  was 
reduced, effectively, to 33 percent in case of foreign currency-denominated housing loans. 
The latest developments of the credit market indicate that the currency structure of new housing 
loans significantly improved as borrowers decided to take FX loans less frequently. Unlike in the 
period immediately prior to the global financial crisis, in the past two years banks have been 
extending primarily zloty denominated loans (see figure 24). After the introduction of 
Recommendation T and amended Recommendation S, the banks significantly tightened their 
requirements concerning minimum creditworthiness for clients applying for foreign currency 
loans. It should be pointed out that substantial the depreciation of zloty against Swiss franc and the 
euro also played role, even if that effect was partly offset by significant decline of interest rates in 
both Switzerland and the eurozone. 
II. FUTURE CHALLENGES 
1. Cross-border regulation and national regulation 
As described in section A, the Polish banking sector is fairly diversified, although subsidiaries of 
foreign banks have by far the largest share in the market. From a regulatory perspective, there is 
no  difference  in  treatment  of  those  subsidiaries  and  domestically  held  banks.  The  KNF’s 
experience has also shown that there is no material difference in how these entities comply with 
prudential regulations. As long as foreign banks operate in the Polish market via subsidiaries being 
legal  persons  incorporated  in  Poland  and  subject  to  prudential  requirements  on  a  solo  basis, 
authorities are able both to effectively supervise each of them and to pursue sector-wide macro-
prudential  policies.  Problems  may  arise  when  banks  restructure  in  order  to  give  the  parent 
companies more influence over their business lines, when international regulatory changes foster 
further dependence of subsidiaries on the parent companies, or when a branch (not having legal 
personality and subject to only limited supervision) becomes so large that its failure may cause 
market-wide turbulences.  
Main problems with burden sharing 
In Poland, not a single bank collapsed as a result of the financial crisis, and the public budget was 
not called upon to rescue private institutions. Because of this, the Polish authorities have not tested 
burden-sharing mechanisms existing at the European level. The lessons learned by the authorities 
from other countries are, however, quite clear. In the weeks following the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, it became evident that the European burden sharing framework (if one truly existed) had 
critical gaps. On many occasions, both supervisors and governments intervening to prevent the 
collapse of a financial institution were quarrelling about who should bear the costs; in some cases, 
those who did felt like they were paying another country’s bills.  
Problems  emerged  both  with  foreign  branches  and  subsidiaries  of  financial  institutions.  The 
starkest example of the former was the failure of Landsbanki, the Icelandic bank with branches 
across northern Europe. Three years after its bankruptcy, Iceland has still failed to comply with its 
obligation to reimburse the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for deposits lost by Landsbanki’s   15 
clients in those two countries. (The UK and the Netherlands had covered, respectively, £2.25 
billion and €1.33 billion in losses to their domestic depositors as the Icelandic deposit guarantee 
scheme proved to be insolvent.) 
Serious  controversies  have  also  surrounded  the  restructuring  of  several  banking  groups  with 
subsidiaries  in  various  countries.  The  Fortis  affair,  for  instance,  almost  toppled  the  Belgian 
government and left the Dutch government bearing an unproportional part of costs. In some cases 
wrong decisions taken in the headquarters of international groups affected subsidiaries’ ability to 
continue business. New arrangements were badly needed. 
While moral hazard embedded in the system was rightly indicated as one of underlying reasons of 
the financial sector’s excesses, present day regulatory efforts at the EU level do not appear to take 
it fully into account. In fact, some of the proposed initiatives could further exacerbate the split 
between the power to make decisions and responsibility for these decisions. It has been proposed 
that key decisions be vested in parent companies, consolidated supervisors, and EU agencies; at 
the  same  time,  responsibility  for  those  decisions  would  be  borne  by  local  subsidiaries,  host-
country deposit guarantee schemes, and state’s budgets. This discrepancy is not only unjust, it may 
also prove dangerous.  
The KNF finds it useful to rearticulate two basic principles that should govern further work on 
burden sharing and related matters. First, responsibility must be coupled with real competences. 
As costs of crises are ultimately to be borne at the national level, national authorities must have 
adequate tools to prevent bank failures effectively. Among those tools are prudential and conduct-
of-business  regulations,  off-site  and  on-site  monitoring,  discretionary  decisions  addressed  to 
individual institutions, resolution mechanisms, etc.  
Second,  we  should  avoid  adopting  solutions  that  are  contrary  to  the  basics  of  free-market 
economics. This assertion has two practical applications. One is that banks must be allowed to fail, 
just like any other business (with the exception that its assets should be transferred in an orderly 
way to another bank or vehicle). Without this, curbing moral hazards are just empty words. The 
second  consequence  of  the  free-market  perspective  should  be  respect  for  the  arm’s  length 
principle. Each bank must be able to survive periods of stress on a stand-alone basis, without 
tapping into affiliated entities and without being forced to prop them up. Consequently, each bank 
must fulfill prudential requirements on a solo basis. What the crisis should actuate regulators to do 
is tighten requirements at the local level, not abolish them. 
The above principles should be applied to all financial sector regulations, and macro-prudential 
measures are no exception. As a starting point, it should be stressed that efforts to boost economic 
growth should not, even in these times of high uncertainty, result in  stimulating or tolerating 
emerging  imbalances  in  the  financial  system.  Another  assertion:  the  important  role  of  credit 
intermediation that the financial sector plays in each economy should be suited to this economy’s 
characteristics.  Economies  throughout  Europe  differ  remarkably  in  terms  of  their  level  of 
development, economic cycle, and credit cycle. Uncontrolled credit growth may or may not be a 
problem at a given time. That makes it impossible to determine common EU-wide parameters 
banks should comply with, if the sector is to play its role in the most effective and at the same time 
safe  way.  Reactions  to  economic  and  credit  conditions  must  differ  across  countries.  Macro-
prudential  measures  should  be  available  at  the  local  level,  where  responsibility  for  financial   16 
stability also remains. These measures are even more relevant for the countries of the eurozone 
that surrendered their monetary policy instruments.  
As a final note, it should be mentioned that it is important, too, that macro-prudential measures are 
applied—with due consideration to the economic environment—to each individual bank, including 
domestic parts of international groups, thereby ensuring that the sector is covered in its entirety.  
Basel III and CRD IV 
Basel III, although not perfect, has generally met the criteria mentioned in the paragraphs above. It 
provided that the new capital and liquidity standards can be applied at the national level, with 
national supervisors being given the ability to tighten them. The requirements would be imposed 
on banking groups at the consolidated level but authorities could decide on imposing them on 
individual institutions within the groups. And the Basel documents explicitly refer to the arm’s 
length principle when talking about intragroup relations. All this raised hopes that the Basel toolkit 
would be available for efficient use for macro-prudential purposes. 
Against  this  background,  the  European  implementation  of  the  Basel  III  Capital  Requirements 
Directive (CRD) IV raised some concerns on the part of KNF. As a general observation, it should 
be noted that the revised CRD, now accompanied by the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), 
goes significantly beyond the Basel consensus, not on the merit, but in regard to the issues of 
application. KNF believes this modification will not be helpful for financial sector regulators and 
supervisors whose primary aim is preserving financial stability. What follows is a more detailed 
description of some aspects of CRD IV as they influence national authorities’ ability to conduct 
macro-prudential policy.   
Maximum harmonization regulation 
It is revolutionary to propose maximizing harmonization of a large part of banking law, namely all 
the Pillar I requirements. According to the European Commission’s proposal, national regulatory 
authorities  will  no  longer  be  allowed  to  tighten  prudential  requirements  above  the  levels 
established by the new CRR. This is contradictory to the lessons derived from the recent crisis, 
which exposed country-specific  gaps in  regulatory  regimes.  Maximum  harmonization will not 
allow national regulators to address existing and potential problems if the solution goes beyond the 
CRR standards.  
These problems are real. In countries where investment banking and proprietary trading by banks 
play a significant role, regulators are rightly considering core Tier 1 ratios above those inscribed 
into the CRD/CRR. In countries with a massive stock of foreign currency loans, authorities may be 
contemplating extraordinary measures to limit this kind of lending and protect the banking sector 
from risks related to depreciation of local currencies. In some host countries, regulators would like 
to see sizeable branches of foreign credit institutions subject to some prudential requirements. All 
these efforts will not be possible under the maximum harmonization approach of the CRR. As a 
result, the CRD/CRR may, in some respects, ultimately result in weakening of regulatory and 
supervisory regime. 
Poland may be among the countries affected negatively by the European single rule book. Risk 
weights in the standardized approach to credit risk, for instance, will be harmonized under the   17 
CRR. While in some cases national authorities will be allowed to set a higher risk weight, it would 
have  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  regulatory  technical  standards  developed  by  the  European 
Banking Authority and after meeting certain conditions. This procedure will need to be employed 
in Poland, inter alia, for the risk weight for FX mortgage and consumer loans, which is currently at 
100 percent while the level proposed by the European Commission is 35 percent. The CRR level 
may be appropriate for countries of the eurozone, but it neglects specific problems of countries 
with a high stock of FX loans. High currency volatility in  Europe is  a clear issue in today’s 
economic climate, and  banks  with  significant  FX exposure should be required to  hold  higher 
capital than those lending overwhelmingly or exclusively in a domestic currency. Other results of 
the maximum harmonization of capital requirements would include, for instance, elimination of a 
KNF-imposed limit of 15 percent of risk-weighted assets (calculated in the standardized approach) 
that can be excluded from the calculation under the internal ratings-based approach. 
It has been stated that maximum harmonization of all prudential requirements is necessary in the 
EU single market. The KNF cannot accept this thesis. If this statement were to be true, then law 
should be fully harmonized in all areas of economic life, not only in banking, and that is hardly 
imaginable, not least due to the separation of national budgets. The benefits of member states’ 
discretion in this field were acknowledged by the de Larosiere report that stated, ―As long as 
agreed  minimum  core  standards  are  harmonized  and  enforced,  a  country  could  take  more 
restrictive  measures  if  it  considers  they  are  domestically  appropriate  to  safeguard  financial 
stability.‖ 
Liquidity requirements 
The new CRD/CRR will introduce the liquidity coverage requirement (LCR) as elaborated by the 
Basel Committee. The KNF has welcomed the work done by the Committee in this realm. Poland 
first introduced its liquidity regime back in 2007, and strengthened it in subsequent years. Our 
three ratios played a role in preventing the transatlantic liquidity crisis from paralyzing the Polish 
interbank market. The LCR, a similar international standard, should strengthen the global financial 
sector’s ability to survive short-term market turbulences.  
Perhaps equally important is the long-term liquidity ratio devised by the Basel Committee—the 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). It will factually promote long-term savings and has the ability 
to restrict long-term borrowing, thus affecting the credit cycle. The effects of the regulation go 
beyond protection of the financial institutions’ resilience against prolonged firm-specific stress 
conditions, and may encompass deceleration of credit expansion and even the transformation of a 
society’s  savings  culture.  KNF  does  not  have  such  a  tool  at  its  disposal  currently.  It  will  be 
difficult for the Polish banks to fulfill the standard as the medium- and long-term deposit base in 
Poland is less robust than in Western Europe. It should, however, at least contribute in a consistent 
way to the much desired transformation of their balance sheet structures.  
The European Commission has decided, for now, to refrain from introducing the NSFR to the 
CRR and is expected to further edit it. Its proposal regarding the LCR in its essence mirrors the 
Basel consensus, but departs from it in terms of the level of application of the liquidity regime. 
While the relevant Basel document starts with the assumption that ―the standards and monitoring 
tools should be applied to all internationally active banks on a consolidated basis,‖ it adds that they 
―may be used for other banks and on any subset of entities of internationally active banks as well   18 
to ensure greater consistency and a level playing field between domestic and cross-border banks.‖ 
This means that national authorities should be able to oblige local banks belonging to cross-border 
groups to fulfill the requirements on a solo basis. The document also acknowledges that host 
regulators may adopt some more stringent parameters within the liquidity standards.  
The  CRR  assumes  an  opposite  approach.  As  a  basis,  the  LCR  and  NSFR  will  be  applied  to 
individual institutions. At the same time, the text proposed by the commission stipulates that, for 
international  groups,  liquidity  requirements  shall  be  applied  only  on  a  consolidated  basis—
provided a number of conditions have been met. The problem is that the conditions are semi-
automatic.  If  a  host  supervisor  agrees  that  the  parent  company  introduced  some  enumerated 
measures, it will not be able to oppose the waiving of liquidity requirements from the subsidiary 
level. 
A situation in which subsidiaries do not fulfill the liquidity requirements could aggravate system-
wide problems with liquidity. The global financial crisis, although it was fundamentally a solvency 
crisis, entered its most acute phase as a liquidity crunch. Many of the largest banks proved to lack 
a sufficient cushion of most liquid assets. Moreover, analyses of the reports drawn up by the 
Committee  of  European  Banking  Supervisors  reveal  that  entities  belonging  to  large  banking 
groups have had higher liquidity deficits than single credit institutions. If individual institutions 
belonging to groups are not forced to build a liquidity cushion, governments and central banks will 
have to remain prepared to act as a lender of last resort for many entities at the same time.  
To summarize, the KNF supports the introduction of the new LCR and NSFR ratios and agrees 
with  the  Basel  Committee  that  some  parameters  should  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  national 
regulators. As for the level of application, we firmly believe that each institution should be subject 
to the liquidity requirements on a solo basis unless it has been relieved from this obligation by a 
discretionary unilateral decision of its competent supervisory authority.  
Intragroup transfer of assets   
The  CRD  liquidity  regime  is  intended  to  facilitate  centralized  liquidity  management.  Another 
European  Commission  initiative,  the  so-called  intragroup  support,  aims  to  enable  parent 
companies to transfer liquid assets among companies within their groups in times of stress. If this 
proposal was implemented, the consequences of liquidity transfers would be company-specific and 
its  macro-prudential  role in  principle should not  be significant.  For this  reason  it will not  be 
discussed  extensively  in  this  report.  What  should  be  stressed  is  that  transfer  of  assets  not 
respecting the arm’s length  principle would introduce another  element  of uncertainty into the 
financial  system,  as  even  subsidiaries  being  very  sound  on  a  stand-alone  basis  could  be 
destabilized by having to aid failing affiliate or parent companies. That will be a new risk factor 
for banks belonging to complex groups in which some of the components generate higher risk, 
especially in periods of general distrust on the market.  
A potential outflow of assets from domestic entities poses a serious challenge for supervisory 
authorities. Any supervisory strategy toward a bank can come to nothing when a bank agrees to be 
deprived of its  liquidity buffer. (The European  Commission  admits  that the supervisor of the 
transferor should have the power to prohibit a transfer of assets, but this decision would have to be   19 
made in consultation with the supervisor responsible for the entity receiving the support and could 
be appealed by the latter to the European Banking Authority). 
In markets dominated by banks that are subsidiaries of foreign institutions, the uncertainty caused 
by the possibility of a sudden asset transfer could be magnified. In an extreme case, some host 
markets may come to be seen as less stable during crises because of the risk of capital outflow. A 
single case of a transfer of assets may result in concerns about other domestic banks’ liquidity 
position. Not only would a supervisory  authority  responsible  for  a host market  face potential 
problems  with  respect  to  particular  banks,  sector-wide  policies,  including  macro-prudential 
measures, could prove less effective if unexpected transfers of assets hit transmission channels. 
Countercyclical capital buffer 
The countercyclical capital buffer is the only element of the Basel III package with a truly clear 
macroeconomic  purpose.  It  offers  national  regulatory  authorities  new  methods  with  which  to 
tackle system-wide risks that originate in the financial sector but subsequently threaten the entire 
economy. The effectiveness of the buffer will depend on details of its calibration and application 
which, in the European Union, will be determined by the revised CRD. 
The experiences of several European countries over the past two decades have shown that existing 
policy  tools  may  not  suffice  to  manage  credit  expansion.  This  has  been  especially  true  for 
countries that no longer conduct their own monetary and FX policy (examples include Spain and 
Ireland but also the Baltic states that pegged their currencies to the euro). But countries from 
outside the monetary union have also found that their interest-rate policies may be not sufficient to 
restrain credit growth, especially when a substantial fraction of loans is denominated in a foreign 
currency.  
From a supervisor’s perspective, excessive credit expansion is a matter of concern as far as it 
contributes to accumulation of risk in the banking sector. In the previous years the KNF has sought 
to mitigate risks related to the quality of the sector’s loan portfolio introducing the LTV and debt-
to-income (DTI) ratios. As noted in section A, each Polish bank has to establish its own maximum 
LTV levels according to its risk profile and justify them. For foreign-currency-denominated loans, 
the LTV ratio cannot exceed 80 percent. In addition, the maximum DTI ratio has been set at 65 
percent for persons earning more than the national salary and 50 percent for those earning less. For 
an  FX  mortgage  loan,  monthly  installment  must  not  exceed  33  percent  of  income.  The 
countercyclical capital buffer will complement these measures, limiting credit distribution in boom 
times and increasing banks’ ability to cover losses in an economic downturn.  
There is a broad consensus, shared by the KNF, that the countercyclical buffer should comprise 
high-quality capital and be activated when growth of credit exceeds the long-term average. The 
proposed credit growth-to-GDP growth ratio is a natural starting point for determining whether 
credit expansion has become excessive. It should, however, be complemented by other factors in 
order to appropriately capture country-specific risks. For instance, in some European countries the 
long-term average credit growth may turn out to be at such a dangerously high level that simply 
not exceeding it might not be enough. In other countries a credit bubble may be forming only in a 
particular sector, and applying the buffer for all banks and all loans would risk placing a burden on 
the sector and the economy without necessarily accomplishing the desired goals. Finally, in some   20 
countries, statistics may be unavailable for a period of time that would underpin firm conclusions 
about  what  level  of  credit  growth  should  be  deemed  excessive.  These  concerns  necessitate 
additional analysis on construction of the new requirement. They can be also partially addressed 
by providing national regulators with a large dose of flexibility in application of the buffer. 
The very objective of the countercyclical buffer entails its application on a country basis. The new 
instrument is meant to help regulators reign in the build-up of credit bubbles. It must be, then, 
applied to all banks lending to a given market (or to a given segment of the economy), domestic 
and foreign, whether via subsidiaries, branches, or directly across borders. For branches and cross-
border lending, there should be full reciprocity among the countries, at least within the EU. In 
other words, the KNF agrees that banks lending to foreign markets via branches or directly should 
build a buffer reflecting a weighted average of national buffers, and this should be done according 
to their credit exposures.  
Finally, attention should be paid to the restrictions imposed on banks that do not build the buffer 
within the given time. There is a risk that constraints on distribution of capital may in extreme 
cases be circumvented by some banks, for instance via transactions on nonmarket conditions. It is 
also imaginable that some banks will deliberately choose not to accumulate the capital buffer and 
not  to  pay  dividends  in  order  to  gain  a  competitive  advantage  by  increasing  their  lending. 
Supervisors should then be authorized to require the bank to form the buffer by a given date.  
Branches of foreign credit institutions  
In some countries, branches of foreign banks have a significant share of the market. A failure of a 
parent company in combination with insolvency of the home country deposit guarantee scheme 
could place a significant financial burden on host country authorities (as in the Icelandic case). At 
the same time, host authorities have only limited powers to supervise branches in the EU. With the 
CRD IV, the European Commission attempts to plug the supervisory gap by entrusting all powers 
in this respect to home supervisors. For the time being, however, the practice of cross-border 
supervision in Europe does not justify going into this direction. In many cases, foreign branches 
have been neglected by home supervisors, although the latter are legally responsible for branches’ 
overall situation. 
The current version of the CRD has allowed host supervisors to request information from branches 
and carry out on-site inspections. With the CRD IV in place, host supervisors will have the ability 
to  obtain  information  on  branches’  liquidity  only  via  home  supervisors.  Moreover,  host 
supervisors will have very limited right to force a branch that commits irregularities within its 
territory into any action. The inspections in branches will be carried out by the host authorities 
only on a case-by-case basis and after a consultation with home supervisors. As a consequence, 
authorities of host member states will be deprived of any meaningful control over branches as well 
as of the possibility to immediately take direct actions toward a branch when it poses a risk to 
financial stability of the given host country. This would create a substantial gap in the system of 
financial  supervision.  Local  supervisors  would  also  have  very  limited  power  to  monitor  the 
situation in a branch on an ongoing basis, despite having the most adequate knowledge to do so.  
The  European  Commission  is  also  proposing  relieving  branches  from  the  obligation  to  meet 
liquidity requirements on a stand-alone basis. The KNF believes the experience of the financial   21 
crisis speaks to the contrary. A determined portion of liquid assets should be kept in a branch to 
satisfy the potential demand of depositors. In Poland, branches of foreign credit institutions are 
required on an ongoing basis to fulfill one or two liquidity ratios, depending on the level of assets.  
The issue of branches must also be considered in the context of the countercyclical capital buffer. 
Adequate arrangements on international reciprocity are especially important, as buffers for credit 
exposures of foreign branches will be established by host authorities but enforced and monitored 
by home authorities. The KNF agrees with the regulators believing that the proposed absolute limit 
of 2.5 percent for international reciprocity should be abolished. In other words, home regulators 
should be allowed to reciprocate the level of buffer set out by host regulators even if it exceeds 2.5 
percent. It will allow supervisory response to adjust to the level of risk.  
Possible further changes in international regulations 
Foreign-currency lending 
FX loans, in the CEE region in particular, have typically been associated with and considered to be 
a particular aspect of inflow of foreign capital into the local financial markets. While retail loans 
are distributed by their local affiliates who also bear the credit risk, the financial institutions of 
home countries provide the necessary capital in the form of wholesale funding to those affiliates. 
If the currency structure of the balance sheet of the parent institution determines the currency in 
which local affiliates receive their funding, the FX risk is effectively passed on to the affiliates. 
These might chose to either go on to build local-currency assets and hedge structural FX risk of 
their balance sheet via hedging operations with their parent (which effectively converts funding 
obtained from their parent into local-currency), or else they can engage in FX lending. In the latter 
case, FX risk is being passed further onto the borrowers, who usually have limited ability to 
manage their exposure. This transmission of risk along the intermediation channel gives rise to a 
number of significant risks that, from the financial stability point of view, are very relevant. It 
should be noted that these risks are in fact highly correlated, and will materialize in the case of 
substantial depreciation of the local currency. 
While foreign capital flows generally exhibit strong cyclicality, the economic impact of FX loans 
is even more pronounced. This is to some extent because of the obvious impact the exchange rate 
has on the value of borrowers’ obligations. But another important factor is the typically high 
correlation between the exchange rate and the general economic environment. This is especially 
true with respect to the real assets, where favorable FX funding conditions may contribute (as has 
been  the  case  in  several  non-euro  EU  member  states  during  the  pre-crisis  years)  to  property 
bubbles that subsequently burst when the conditions changed. 
Moreover, ―dollarization‖ of the credit market reduces the ability of the local central banks to 
control the credit channel in their economies. The effectiveness of their monetary policies is in 
consequence  reduced.  This  observation  is  important  for  non-euro  EU  member  states  as  the 
prevalence of euro-denominated FX loans makes the task of managing the economic convergence 
into the euro zone more difficult. 
The problem of FX lending has become a subject of intense discussion in the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB). Potential instability of the financial market in some of the EU member states 
and depreciation of their currencies can lead to a spillover effect for the European financial market   22 
as a whole. It can potentially work through two channels: the funding interlinkages between the 
credit  instructions  in  the  home  countries  and  their  affiliates,  and  via  home  country  credit 
institutions’ general exposure to the effected countries. This is why KNF supports the ESRB in its 
work on an EU-wide recommendation in this respect. There should be at the European level a 
clear identification of risks as well as general guidance on how to deal with them. At the same 
time, the ESRB does not have any binding instruments on its disposal. Member states should, then, 
elaborate  measures  suitable  for  their  domestic  circumstances,  addressing  market-specific  risks 
stemming from the FX lending. EU regulations should not limit countries’ abilities to introduce 
measures aimed at mitigating risks identified by the ESRB. 
Systemically important financial institutions 
Risks posed by the ―systemically important‖ financial institutions have not decreased since the 
financial crisis. The largest banks have grown even larger, with collected deposits exceeding the 
revenues of national budgets in some cases. At the same time, regulators have not yet agreed on a 
regulatory response.  
The consequences of the failure of a systemically important financial institution (SIFI) are hard to 
estimate, but they could be devastating. Rescuing such a failing institution could force a country 
itself into bankruptcy. With risks so great, regulators should consider any possible initiatives to 
increase safety and soundness of the SIFIs. Higher capital requirements, as proposed recently by 
the Basel Committee, are a possible solution. Additional surcharges should be proportionate to 
additional  risks  generated  by  SIFIs.  At  the  same  time,  reliable  resolution  tools  should  be 
introduced to facilitate the liquidation of even very complex institutions. It must be absolutely 
clear that even the largest bank can fail and will be allowed to fail. The authorities must have 
instruments to liquidate it in an orderly manner. 
The term ―SIFIs‖ has become synonymous with ―large cross-border financial groups.‖ Such an 
approach risks creating a misunderstanding about where systemic risks really originate. Within 
cross-border groups, some entities are sound from a prudential point of view, conservative in their 
strategies, and not that large compared to the market they operate in. Capital surcharges should 
apply principally to those entities within the groups that generate the highest risk, due to their size, 
interconnectedness,  and  sophistication.  Application  of  the  additional  requirements  at  the 
consolidated level could see the parents allocating the burden within the groups most efficiently 
but not necessarily adequately to risk distribution.  
Additional measures to address the problem of branches  
The European Passport facilitated cross-border banking activities. Some large institutions have 
chosen to operate in another country via a branch instead of a subsidiary, even if they have a 
considerable business there. But branches of banks generate risks that branches of other companies 
will never pose. That is why the European Passport should be supplemented by measures that limit 
that risk. One of them could be to set a maximum level of deposits a branch of a bank can collect 
before it must transform into a subsidiary. An alternative solution would see (1) host supervisors 
having greater insight into the situation of institutions operating via branches and (2) branches 
participating in deposit guarantee schemes of the host countries.    23 
Deposit guarantee schemes 
One of the fundamental problems of today’s financial system architecture is that costs are not 
expected to be borne where key decisions are made. The whole responsibility for its misguided 
actions lies with a given financial institution (and, ultimately, the local deposit guarantee scheme), 
even  if  those  actions  were  forced  by  its  parent  company.  In  the  KNF’s  view,  if  a  financial 
institution is a dominating shareholder of another financial institution (―a qualified owner‖), it 
should participate in costs of bankruptcy of the subsidiary. This could be achieved by having the 
parent  company  contributing  to  the  deposit  guarantee  scheme  responsible  for  the  deposits 
collected by the subsidiary.  
Deposit  guarantee  schemes  within  the  EU  could  be  strengthened  further  by  the  creation  of  a 
network of formal linkages between them, especially between home and host countries. As an 
alternative to burdening taxpayers with costs of bank bailouts, the guarantee funds could lend to 
each other in case one of them is unable to repay depositors of a large bank that failed.  
2. Unregulated or lightly regulated institutions 
KNF has often reiterated that any regulations imposed on the financial sector in these difficult 
times need to be carefully tailored and have precise objectives. The risks of overregulating the 
sector,  disturbing  financial  intermediation,  stifling  economic  growth,  and  incentivizing 
unregulated ―shadow banking‖ activity are too great to act without a clear focus. 
A moderate approach should also be assumed toward the wide sphere of the so-called shadow 
banking. Advocates of applying quasi-banking supervision to this diversified group of entities 
should take into account the following three facts. First, clients of hedge funds, money market 
funds, or special investment vehicles are aware of higher risk (compared to products offered by 
banks) and accept it in expectation of higher returns. Second, these entities generate more risks to 
each other than to the banking sector and financial intermediation. Third, most of them are already 
regulated. Having said that, KNF is not willing to enter further into discussion on this matter as the 
ultimate responsibility for regulation of the financial sector lies with the governments, not with 
supervisors.   
III. CONCLUSIONS 
The KNF commenced its  activities on September 19, 2006. The new  authority took  over the 
powers  of  the  Insurance  and  Pension  Funds  Supervision  Commission  and  the  Securities  and 
Exchange Commission. As of January 1, 2008, the KNF took over the powers of the Commission 
for Banking Supervision. As a result, the integrated financial supervision model was introduced. 
One  of  the  challenges  in  the  pre-crisis  period  in  Poland  was  implementation  of  European 
directives pertaining to the financial market. The most important was the CRD. Poland amended 
the  Banking  Act  accordingly,  and  the  Commission  for  Banking  Supervision  issued  several 
resolutions. 
It should be noted that the performance of the Polish financial sector from 2004 to 2008 was very 
good. Despite this, Polish financial supervision worked to ensure a strong capital base among 
credit institutions and to improve the liquidity of those institutions.    24 
The  currency  structure  of  loans  extended  by  banks  may  be  regarded  as  an  important  factor 
influencing  financial  system  stability.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  share  of  foreign-currency-
denominated loans in the loan portfolio is, in comparison with other CEE countries, relatively low, 
risks related to such credits may pose a threat to financial system stability and the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. Of course, the exchange-rate risk depends also on exchange-rate policy. 
Poland  adopted  the  Basel  II  recommendations  and  introduced  detailed  capital  adequacy 
requirements in 2008. KNF resolutions stipulated precise methodology of CAR estimation. The 
assessment of the effectiveness of capital regulations should be connected to the evaluation of 
discretionary measures adopted by the KNF in 2009 and 2010. The quantitative criteria of CAR 
calculation and the execution of banks’ dividend policy in accordance with the KNF requirements 
secured a strong capital base of the Polish banking sector in 2009 and 2010. This helped mitigate 
the impact of credit losses incurred in this period on banks’ financial health.  
Some of the ideas that are central to Basel III were put into effect in Poland even before they were 
endorsed  by  the  Basel  Committee.  The  liquidity  rules  implemented  by  the  Commission  for 
Banking Supervision and later confirmed by the KNF had been developed before the onset of 
turbulence in the global financial markets. Recommendation P (adopted in 2002), Resolution No. 
9/2007 of the Commission for Banking Supervision, and Resolution No. 386/2008 of the KNF are 
the key elements of the Polish liquidity regime. Binding liquidity standards have proven to be very 
effective. As a consequence, the National Bank of Poland has not had  to provide liquidity to the 
banking sector since the end of 2010. 
The KNF has also recommended that banks hold a kind of capital conservation buffer (2 percent 
of risk-weighted assets). The role the Basel Committee intends to attribute to the countercyclical 
capital  buffer  has  been,  at  least  partially,  fulfilled  in  Poland  by  the  DTI  and  LTV  ratios. 
Recommendation T and the amended version of Recommendation S provided for rules concerning 
risk management for credit exposures and introduced quantitative standards for creditworthiness 
assessments. The limits on the debt-to-income ratio and the higher requirements concerning the 
minimum creditworthiness of clients applying for foreign currency loans helped adjust parameters 
of credit growth to existing conditions in the banking sector. 
During recent quarters, banks tightened their credit policy. It should also be underlined that in the 
past two years banks were primarily extending local-currency-denominated loans. There is no 
doubt that such positive actions occurred partly due to the implementation of the regulations. On 
the other hand, the slower increase of FX loans can be explained by the depreciation of the zloty 
and a rise in the awareness of exchange-rate risk. 
Partly due to macro-prudential regulations and partly due to macroeconomic conditions, the credit 
expansion  of  2004–2008  did  not  lead  to  substantial  imbalances  in  the  Polish  economy  and 
financial system. The world is changing very fast, though, and new challenges emerge. Increasing 
globalization of an already global economy, rising capital flows stimulated by loose fiscal and 
monetary policy in most of the developed countries, uncertainty related to public debt burden, and 
multifaceted  regulations  all  make  these  times  challenging  for  financial  sector  regulators  and 
supervisors.    25 
Still, the KNF is confident that the sound fundamentals of the Polish banking sector will enable it 
to  navigate  through  these  turbulent  times  successfully  and  that  the  credit  cycle  can  still  be 
managed with the use of existing tools. Initiatives proposed at the international level, including the 
capital buffers and closer examination of the problem of foreign currency lending, will be of 
additional assistance. As stressed in the previous sections, any measures introduced to protect 
financial stability or smooth the credit cycle should be applied at the local level, where specific 
risks originate. 
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Annex—Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Assets of financial institutions in Poland (PLN billion) 




banks   466.5  489.0   538.5  586.5  681.8  792.8  1035.4  1057.4  1158.0 
Credit unions   2.5  3.3  4.2  5.3  6.0  7.3  9.4  11.6  14.1 
Insurance 
companies  57.6  65.7  77.9  89.6  108.6  126.9  137.9  139  145.1 
Investment 
funds   23  33.8  37.6  61.6  99.2  133.8  73.9  93.4  121.8 
Open pension 
funds   31.6  44.8  62.6  86.1  116.6  140  138.3  178.6  223.3 
Brokerage 
entities   2.8  3.7  5.5  6.9  10.8  11.8  8.6  9.9  9.2 
Total  584.0  640.3  726.3  836  1023.0  1212.6  1403.5  1489.9  1671.5 
Source: NBP, KNF, KSKOK. 
 
Table 2. Assets of financial institutions in Poland (% of GDP) 




banks   57.7  58.0  58.2  59.6  64.3  67.4  81.2  78.7  81.8 
Credit unions   0.3  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.9  1.0 
Insurance 
companies  7.1  7.8  8.4  9.1  10.2  10.8  10.8  10.3  10.3 
Investment 
funds   2.8  4.0  4.1  6.3  9.4  11.4  5.8  7.0  8.6 
Open pension 
funds   3.9  5.3  6.8  8.8  11.0  11.9  10.8  13.3  15.8 
Brokerage 
entities   0.3  0.4  0.6  0.7  1.0  1.0  0.7  0.7  0.6 
Total  72.2  75.9  78.6  85.0  96.5  103.0  110.0  110.9  118.1 
Source: NBP, KNF, KSKOK. 
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Table 3. Growth rate of assets of financial institutions in Poland (%) 




banks   4.8  10.1  8.9  16.2  16.3  30.6  2.1  9.5 
Credit 
unions   32.0  27.3  26.2  13.2  21.7  28.8  23.4  21.8 
Insurance 
companies  14.1  18.6  15.0  21.2  16.9  8.7  0.8  4.4 
Investment 
funds   47.0  11.2  63.8  61.0  34.9  -44.8  26.4  30.4 
Open 
pension 
funds   41.8  39.7  37.5  35.4  20.1  -1.2  29.1  25.0 
Brokerage 
entities   32.1  48.6  25.5  56.5  9.3  -27.1  15.1  -7.1 
Total  9.6  13.4  15.1  22.4  18.5  15.7  6.2  12.2 
Source: NBP, KNF, KSKOK. 
 
Table 4. Number of banks and branches of credit institutions carrying out operational 
activities 
Institutions  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Commercial 
banks   59  58  54  54  51  50  52  49  49 
Cooperative 
banks   605  600  596  588  584  581  579  576  576 
Branches of 
credit 
institutions  x  x  3  7  12  14  18  18  21 
Total  664  658  653  649  647  645  649  643  646 
Source: NBP, KNF. 
 
     28 
Table 5. The ownership structure of the banking sector (% of total banking sector assets) 
  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
1. Domestic 
investors   32.6  32.2  32.5  30  30.3  29.1  27.7  31.9  33.8 
1.1. Banks with 
major state 





shareholding  2.5  2.6  6.6  3.9  4.3  4.6  5.0  5.3  6.2 
1.3. 
Cooperative 
banks  5  5.2  5.3  5.8  6.2  6.2  5.4  5.8  6.1 
2. Foreign 
investors  67.4  67.8  67.5  70  69.7  70.9  72.3  68.1  66.2 
2.1. 
Commercial 
banks  67.4  67.8  66.9  69.1  66.6  66.6  66.9  62.8  61.5 
2.2. Branches 
of credit 
institutions  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.9  3.1  4.3  5.4  5.3  4.7 
Source: NBP, KNF. 
 
Table 6. Top 5 foreign investors in banking sector 
Year  Country (% of total Polish banking sector assets) 
2002  Germany (17.9)  Italy (14.1)  USA (8.6)  Netherlands 
(6.8) 
Belgium (5.9) 
2003  Germany (18.2)  Italy (13.2)  USA (9.0)  Netherlands 
(7.2) 
Belgium (5.8) 
2004  Germany (18.9)  Italy (11.2)  USA (8.7)  Netherlands 
(7.9) 
Belgium (5.0) 
2005  Italy (21.1)  Germany (8.7)  Netherlands 
(8.2) 
USA (7.9)  Ireland (4.8) 
2006  Italy (19.9)  Germany (8.4)  Netherlands 
(8.2) 
USA (7.8)  Belgium (4.9) 
2007  Italy (17.4)  Netherlands 
(10.9) 
Germany (9.3)  USA (7.4)  Belgium (5.6) 
2008  Italy (13.4)  Netherlands 
(10.8) 
Germany (10.2)  USA (8.6)  Belgium (6.1) 
2009  Italy (13.3)  Germany (9.9)  Netherlands 
(8.7) 
USA (7.4)  Belgium (5.7) 
2010  Italy (12.4)  Germany (10.4)  Netherlands 
(8.6) 
USA (6.9)  France (5.8) 
Source: NBP, KNF. 
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Table 7. Selected profitability and performance ratios of the banking sector (%) 
Ratio  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
ROA  0.5  0.5  1.4  1.6  1.8  1.7  1.6  0.9  1.05 
ROE  5.8  5.8  17.2  20.6  22.4  22.5  21.1  11.3  12.7 
CAR  13.8  13.7  15.5  14.5  13.2  12.1  11.2  13.3  13.8 
NIM  3.4  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.1  3.2  2.6  2.8 
NPL  21.1  21.2  14.9  11.0  7.4  4.1  3.5  7.5  8.5 
ROA – Return of Assets; ROE – Return of Equity; CAR – Capital Adequacy Ratio (minimum requirement is 8 percent and this 
level is binding); NIM – Net Interest Margin, NPL – Nonperforming Loans ratio. Source: NBP, KNF. 
 
Table 8. Structure of large credit exposures by section of economic activity classification 
Section  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
A  2.0  1.7  1.6  1.7  1.5  1.5  2.7 
B  0.8  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
C  36.2  36.5  38.4  34.7  31.8  31.2  31.1 
F  7.0  7.5  8.1  9.7  10.8  10.9  16.9 
Market 
services  54.1  53.8  51.3  53.2  55.1  55.4  49.1 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Notes: A – Agriculture, B – Mining, C – Manufacturing, F – Construction; Market services – Retail trade and repairs; 
transportation and storage; hotels and restaurants; information and communication; real estate activities; professional activities. 
Data for 2008–2010 are presented at the end of September, other years—at the end of December. Large exposures: for a bank in the 
form of a joint stock company, state-run bank, and a nonassociated cooperative bank, an exposure toward one enterprise in excess 
of PLN 500,000; for an associated cooperative bank an exposure toward one client in excess of PLN 50,000. Source: NBP. 
 
Table 9. Number of banks failing to meet supervisory liquidity standards  
  03.2009  06.2009  09.2009  12.2009  03.2010  06.2010  09.2010  12.2010 
Commercial 
banks 
4  1  3  1  0  0  0  0 
Cooperative 
banks  









4.7  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 
Source: KNF. 
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Figure 1. GDP growth rate (y/y, quarterly data)  Figure 2. Consumer Price Index (CPI; 
y/y, monthly data) and inflation target  
      
Source: CSO.             Source: CSO, NBP. 
               
Figure 3. Warsaw Stock Exchange indices    Figure 4. Capitalization of stock market 
(monthly data) 
     
Notes: January 2002 = 100.          Notes: capitalization concerns only domestic companies. 
Source: Bloomberg.          Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 5. Annual growth in residential property  Figure 6. Credit-to-GDP ratio (quarterly data) 
ask prices in the biggest cities 
   
     
Source: NBP.            Source: CSO. 
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Figure 7. Credit-to-GDP ratio and HP trend    Figure 8. Housing loans-to-GDP ratio (quarterly 
(quarterly data)           data) 
     
Notes: lambda = 400000: BCBS proposal;      Source: authors’ calculation. 
lambda = 1600: typical value of smoothing        
parameter in business cycle analysis. 
Source: authors’ calculation. 
 
Figure 9. Credit-to-GDP ratio gap (quarterly data)  Figure 10. Housing loans-to-GDP ratio gap 
(quarterly data)  
     
Source: authors’ calculation.          Source: authors’ calculation.   
 
Figure 11. Structure of loans for nonfinancial sector  Figure 12. Currency structure of loans for 
nonfinancial sector    
     
Source: NBP.             Source: NBP. 
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Figure 13. Currency structure of corporate loans    Figure 14. Currency structure of household loans 
     
Source: NBP.            Source: NBP. 
 
Figure 15. NBP reference rate and interbank    Figure 16. Nominal exchange rate of 
interest rates             zloty (monthly data) 
         
Source: NBP, Bloomberg.     Notes: monthly average exchange rate; January 2002 = 100; 
the growth means depreciation of the zloty. 
Source: NBP. 
   
Figure 17. Structure of loans to households    Figure 18. Gross capital inflows (quarterly data)   
     
Source: NBP.             Notes: gross capital inflows are: total FDI in Poland,  
              portfolio investments liabilities and other investment  
              liabilities. Source: authors’ calculation. 
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Figure 19. Net capital flows (quarterly data)     Figure 20. Liabilities and claims to parent banks   
     
Note: net capital flows = net financial account.       Source: KNF. 
Source: authors’ calculation.          
 
 
Figure 21. Structure of gross capital inflows  Figure 22. Domestic and cross-border loans 
(% of GDP)    for nonfinancial sector (quarterly data)  
     
Source: own calculation.          Source: JEDH and NBP.       
   
 
Figure 23. Liquidity ratios in banks with assets  Figure 24.  Currency structure of new housing 
above 200 million PLN            loans to households 
       
Notes: STLR: short-term liquidity ratio; LTLR; long-term    Source: KNF. 
liquidity ratio, i.e. ratio of coverage of illiquid and limited  
liquidity assets with regulatory capital and external funds.  
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Fig. 25. Unemployment and activity rates   
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